The decades-old Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan has once again come under scrutiny, with renewed arguments emerging from Indian policy circles that the agreement institutionalised deep asymmetries in water sharing and disproportionately constrained India despite its position as the upper riparian state.
Signed on September 19, 1960, with the mediation of the World Bank, the treaty governs the distribution and usage of the six rivers of the Indus Basin system — the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — which sustain agriculture, hydropower and drinking water supplies for millions across both countries.
Indian analysts and officials increasingly argue that the treaty reflected a pattern of unilateral concessions by India that eventually translated into strategic disadvantages, while Pakistan allegedly leveraged the agreement to secure guaranteed water flows and restrict India’s developmental activities in Jammu and Kashmir and adjoining regions.
The roots of the dispute trace back to the 1947 partition of British India, which divided not only territory but also the intricate canal and irrigation network built under colonial administration.
India retained control over the headwaters of most of the rivers, while Pakistan inherited vast downstream agricultural regions, particularly in Punjab, that depended heavily on uninterrupted water supplies originating upstream in Indian territory.
To avoid escalating tensions between the newly independent states, negotiations began with international involvement, eventually leading to the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.
Indian accounts of the negotiations contend that New Delhi entered the talks seeking a practical and cooperative resolution despite its own growing irrigation and energy demands in Punjab and Rajasthan.
According to this perspective, the final arrangement evolved into a heavily concessionary pact that granted Pakistan overwhelming access to the basin’s waters while significantly restricting India’s future use.
A major point raised by Indian commentators concerns the negotiation process itself, particularly the role of the World Bank’s 1954 proposal.
According to Indian interpretations, the proposal required India to abandon planned developments on the upper reaches of the Indus and Chenab rivers, relinquish diversion rights over significant Chenab waters, and accept limits on development activities in regions such as Kutch.
India is said to have accepted the framework rapidly as a demonstration of goodwill and a desire for stability. Pakistan, however, delayed formal acceptance for nearly five years, eventually endorsing the proposal in December 1958.
Indian observers argue that the delay allowed Pakistan to continue developing projects on the western rivers while India remained bound by restrictions it had already accepted in principle. They contend that this set a precedent in which obstruction and prolonged negotiations yielded strategic advantages for Pakistan.
The treaty ultimately divided the river system into eastern and western rivers.
India received exclusive rights over the eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej while Pakistan was granted rights over the western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.
Indian officials note that the eastern rivers collectively carry around 33 million acre-feet (MAF) of annual flow, compared to approximately 135 MAF in the western rivers allocated largely to Pakistan.
Pakistan obtained access to roughly 80 per cent of the total basin waters, while India retained about 20 per cent.
Critics within India argue that the agreement did not actually provide India with additional water resources, but merely formalised access to rivers already under Indian usage while requiring New Delhi to relinquish broader claims over the substantially larger western river system.
Although India retained limited rights for non-consumptive uses such as run-of-river hydropower generation on the western rivers, these activities were subjected to extensive design, storage and operational restrictions under the treaty framework.
One of the treaty’s most debated provisions concerns the financial settlement attached to the agreement.
India agreed to contribute approximately £62 million at the time estimated by some analysts at roughly $2.5 billion in present-day value to help Pakistan construct replacement infrastructure and water management systems, including facilities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Indian analysts describe the arrangement as historically unusual because the upstream country not only surrendered the majority of the river system’s waters but also financed infrastructure for the downstream state as part of the settlement.
According to this interpretation, India effectively subsidised Pakistan’s acceptance of an agreement that already favoured Islamabad in terms of water allocation.
Another major criticism focuses on what Indian experts describe as the treaty’s “structural asymmetry.”
India faces detailed restrictions on irrigation, storage capacity and hydropower design on the western rivers flowing through its own territory.
The treaty limits the extent of irrigated cropped area India can develop using western river waters. It also imposes caps on storage facilities and prescribes specific technical parameters for hydropower projects, including pondage and operational mechanisms.
Indian commentators argue that these obligations apply almost exclusively to India and are not matched by equivalent transparency or development restrictions on Pakistan.
They contend that the arrangement effectively subjects India’s upstream activities to constant scrutiny while guaranteeing downstream flows to Pakistan, thereby limiting India’s ability to fully utilise resources originating within its territory.
The Indus Waters Treaty has often been described internationally as one of the world’s most durable water-sharing agreements, having survived wars, military standoffs and prolonged diplomatic crises between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
However, periodic disputes over Indian hydropower projects on the western rivers including Kishanganga and Ratle have repeatedly triggered arbitration processes and diplomatic friction.
In India, a growing section of policymakers and strategic analysts now argues that the treaty should be revisited in light of changing geopolitical realities, climate pressures, rising domestic water demand and what they describe as Pakistan’s repeated “weaponisation” of treaty mechanisms to delay or obstruct Indian infrastructure projects.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has consistently maintained that the treaty remains a binding international agreement essential for protecting downstream water security and regional stability.
