India has intensified its criticism of the decades-old Indus Waters Treaty, accusing Pakistan of systematically exploiting the agreement to obstruct Indian infrastructure development, suppress economic growth in Jammu and Kashmir, and advance what Indian analysts describe as a misleading global narrative of “water aggression.”
The renewed position forms part of a broader reassessment within Indian strategic and policy circles over the 1960 treaty brokered by the World Bank between India and Pakistan.
Indian officials and commentators argue that while New Delhi has maintained uninterrupted compliance with the agreement for more than six decades — including during wars and periods of heightened terrorism — Pakistan has increasingly used the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms as instruments of political and developmental obstruction rather than technical oversight.
India Alleges Pattern of Obstruction
At the centre of India’s criticism is what it describes as Pakistan’s repeated opposition to hydropower and water management projects on the western rivers allocated largely to Pakistan under the treaty framework.
Indian authorities point to projects such as Baglihar, Kishenganga, Pakal Dul and Tulbul, all of which have faced prolonged legal, technical or arbitration challenges initiated by Pakistan.
According to the Indian position, many of these projects fall within the permissible limits of the treaty and are primarily designed as run-of-river hydropower facilities rather than large-scale diversion or storage schemes.
Indian analysts argue that Pakistan’s objections have frequently extended beyond treaty compliance concerns and are instead aimed at delaying infrastructure growth in Jammu and Kashmir.
They also note what they describe as a contradiction in Pakistan’s approach, claiming that some Indian projects could help regulate seasonal flows and moderate flooding downstream, yet continue to face resistance.
India has also criticised what it calls Pakistan’s international “water war” narrative, under which Islamabad has repeatedly portrayed India as a potential threat to Pakistan’s water security.
Indian policymakers argue that the narrative has been strategically deployed in diplomatic and academic forums to generate international sympathy and pressure India despite the absence of treaty violations.
According to Indian accounts, New Delhi has not suspended or violated the treaty during major military confrontations between the two countries, including the 1965 and 1971 wars, as well as the 1999 Kargil conflict.
Indian officials further argue that treaty compliance continued even during periods when India accused Pakistan of sponsoring cross-border terrorism.
Indian strategic assessments increasingly focus on the long-term economic implications of the treaty, particularly in northern India and Jammu and Kashmir.
According to these assessments, restrictions on irrigation and storage capacity have limited agricultural expansion in parts of Rajasthan and Punjab, forcing reliance on alternative and more expensive water management systems.
The impact on Jammu and Kashmir is considered especially significant because the region lies along the western rivers and possesses substantial hydropower potential.
Indian experts argue that repeated disputes, technical constraints and arbitration risks have slowed investment and prevented the full utilisation of the region’s natural resources.
This, they contend, has contributed to perceptions among local communities that the treaty functions less as a cooperative framework and more as an externally imposed limitation on regional development.
India also links the treaty debate to broader national energy security considerations.
Hydropower generated from the western rivers is viewed as a potentially major source of renewable energy capable of reducing dependence on fossil fuels and improving energy access in northern India.
However, Indian policymakers argue that operational restrictions and prolonged disputes have significantly constrained that potential.
According to this perspective, India has been unable to optimally exploit clean energy resources originating within its own territory due to treaty provisions and Pakistan’s objections.
The growing debate has also taken on a broader geopolitical and security dimension.
Indian commentators increasingly argue that the treaty was founded on assumptions of goodwill and peaceful bilateral engagement that no longer reflect current realities.
They point to major terror incidents blamed on Pakistan-based groups, including the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, as evidence that the foundational spirit underpinning the agreement has eroded.
According to this position, international agreements depend not only on legal obligations but also on reciprocal good faith between signatories.
Indian analysts argue that Pakistan cannot simultaneously benefit from the treaty while allegedly violating broader norms of bilateral conduct through support for cross-border militancy.
This argument has fuelled calls within India for a strategic reassessment of the treaty and for stronger assertions of India’s rights over the Indus Basin system.
Despite the renewed criticism, the Indus Waters Treaty remains widely regarded internationally as one of the world’s most durable transboundary water-sharing agreements.
The treaty has survived multiple wars, military crises and prolonged diplomatic breakdowns between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Supporters of the agreement argue that it has prevented large-scale water conflict in South Asia and continues to provide a stable framework for water management in a volatile region.
Pakistan has consistently maintained that the treaty is essential for its agricultural survival and water security, given its dependence on the Indus Basin system.
However, Indian analysts now contend that the global portrayal of the treaty as an unqualified diplomatic success overlooks what they describe as the unequal concessions embedded within the agreement from its inception.
