by Yunusa Bunu Zanna
A video of Ahmad Muhammad Kabir, a student from the Federal University Dutsin-Ma (FUDMA) in Katsina State, surfaced on the internet, showing him confessing to providing logistical support and supplying weapons to bandits for money. Kabir was apprehended by law enforcement while attempting to transport a significant amount of ammunition from Nasarawa to bandits in Dutsin-Ma, Katsina State.
For those of us from Borno, where the Boko Haram insurgency has deeply affected our lives, it is common knowledge that, after religious indoctrination, poverty is the main driving force behind terrorism. Nearly every journalist in Borno has reported cases of individuals supplying logistics to Boko Haram for as little as N5000.
Just a few days ago, high-profile suppliers of pharmaceuticals, food, and vehicle spare parts were arrested by the troops of Operation Hadin Kai in the North East. Over the last decade, the supply chain for Boko Haram has been significantly disrupted despite the heightened poverty in the region. This progress can be attributed to several factors:
First and most importantly, prayers; second, the vigilance of people, especially those who volunteered to be part of the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), who now question the movement of people into the bush with supplies. Lastly, the military and other security agencies have effectively sensitized people to the repercussions of supporting insurgents in their communities.
The major success factors in the fight against Boko Haram in the North East have been the political will of Governor Babagana Umara Zulum and traditional leaders to end the insurgency, even at the risk of their own lives, coupled with the dedication of military commanders backed by fearless troops. The land and air components of Operation Hadin Kai, then led by the current Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. CG Musa, as the theater commander, Maj. Gen. Abdul Ibrahim Khalifa as Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force, and Maj. Gen. AA Eyitayo as the GOC 7 Division, later succeeded by Maj. Gen. W. Shaibu, and their various frontline commanders and troops, were able to build a strong understanding and trust with the local community, unified in their goal to end Boko Haram.
Although internal crises within the terrorist ranks played a role, the turning point in the fight against Boko Haram came when the people, government, and military collectively declared ‘enough is enough.’ Many insurgents fled to the North West and over a hundred thousand surrendered.
In the North West and Central regions, the primary drivers of insecurity are not just kidnapping and banditry but also the illegal mining of natural resources. The ongoing instability is perpetuated by those benefiting from the mining economy, which thrives on chaos.
It is not enough for the Minister of State for Defence to say ‘enough is enough’ and direct the relocation of service chiefs to the North West without the people also declaring the same. However, such directives are the exclusive prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), who alone can command such actions. This authority cannot even be delegated to the Vice President, contrary to what some may believe.
Consider the case of Bello Turji: should the entire Chief of Defence Staff and service chiefs be involved in his pursuit? What happens when a bigger threat emerges? The reality is we still have brave officers like the late Lt. Col. AH Ali in our armed forces who are capable and committed to their duty.
Yet, serious questions remain: How did Bello Turji’s men gain access to military Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs)? The troops in Zurmi acted on intelligence that bandits, including those associated with Bello Turji, Sani Black, Na Dutsen Kura, Dan Dogo, Buharin Daji, Alhaji Kundu, and Nasanda, were gathering in large numbers. The plan was to strike with air force support, but unfortunately, bad weather hampered the air support, and the APCs got stuck, forcing the troops to abandon them temporarily. Turji’s men exploited this lapse, using it to spread propaganda. It is funny how they tried to disguised under religious pretexts.
Background on how bandits operate
Understanding the operations of bandits is crucial. Banditry in the North West and Central regions began with minor thefts of livestock before escalating to widespread kidnapping. Their network heavily relies on motorcycles for mobility, enabling swift and often unnoticed movement across vast forested areas. For example, they travel from Anka in Zamfara through forests to Niger, Kaduna, and Abuja, executing operations and returning undetected. Their ability to navigate these routes gives them a strategic advantage and operational efficiency.
Kidnapping remains the primary operation of bandits. They have turned the forests into marketplaces where kidnapped foreigners or high-profile individuals are sold to the highest bidder, eventually reaching figures like Dogo Gide or Bello Turji for final negotiations. Besides kidnapping, bandits engage in cattle theft and attack towns, with some even demanding motorcycles as part of the ransom, as seen in the recent case of Sarkin Gobir, Muhammad Bawa, who was killed by bandits after failing to pay the ransom within their deadline.
About two-thirds of arable farmlands are now inaccessible due to fear of banditry, leading to severe economic losses, food and nutrition insecurity, psychological and social imbalances.
The interests of their sponsors extend to the lucrative mining sector, particularly in areas rich with minerals like gold, beryl, carnelian, tantalite, and diamonds. Bandits are especially active in Zamfara and Niger states, exploiting the high volume of transactions and the presence of foreign nationals who unfortunately sent out countless trucks of our minerals on daily basis to their country. Corruption within the mining industry aids bandits, with some miners acting as informants and collaborators.
Reports indicate that not all miners are involved, but a significant number are on the bandits’ payroll. Collaboration with locals and paying off bandits ensures smooth mining operations in these forests, as research has shown.
There are also reports implicating high-profile personalities, including traditional leaders, security personnel, royal entities, politicians, and ordinary citizens in the banditry plaguing Northern Nigeria.
Even Bello Turji, the notorious bandit leader, has accused high-profile figures of sponsoring banditry. Yet, these accusations are ignored, and those implicated continue to live freely, and even celebrated, while local communities bear the brunt of the violence. In what appears to be a patriotic gesture, Turji, in a video has called for an investigation into his claims, stating that if the country truly wants to end banditry, these accusations should be examined. However, if no action is taken, he claims to have nothing to lose or fear, leaving the local populations to continue suffering and dying.
Their strongholds
Bandits are spread across many locations in the North, including Tsafe LGA in Zamfara State, Ajja Forest in Safe LGA, Dansadau Forest, Gurusu Forest, Anka LGA in Zamfara, Onashi Forest in Danko Wasagu LGA of Kebbi State, Bunu Forest in Rijau LGA, Niger State, and Kainji and Shiroro Forests in Niger State, where Dogo Gide operates. Other locations include Kolakongi and Kakala Forests in Kaduna State, Yartsamiya in Faskari LGA of Katsina State, Nachibi Forest in Birnin Gwari LGA, Kaduna State, Dogon Dawa Forest in Sabuwa LGA of Katsina State near Mallam Abba’s territory, Chukuba Forest in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State, Rijana Forest where they downed an Air Force plane, Mango Forest near Sarkin Power in Kaduna State, Garam Forest on the Kaduna-Niger border connected to Bwari, Gada Biyu Forest in Gwagwalada LGA, Niger State, and Abaji Forest. Each camp houses between 200 to 300 individuals, although they can mobilize additional forces from other camps for operations. When dislodged by security forces, they relocate to the next camp. Typically, each camp possesses hundreds of motorcycles, each carrying three people; when two individuals are aboard, the third typically carries ammunition.
The bandits are even active on social media platforms like TikTok, posting regularly, making it crucial to track and monitor their online presence. Many Nigerians still wonder why they can’t be tracked down when erring (unpatriotic) protesters could be tracked.
To effectively combat banditry, the military alone cannot bring an end to this crisis. What worked in Borno must be replicated in each state where bandits operate if we genuinely want to end this scourge.
Here are some recommendations:
1. Leadership: Governors must exhibit the same fearless, courageous, and determined leadership demonstrated by Governor Babagana Umara Zulum in the fight against Boko Haram.
2. Synergy between Armed Forces: There must be a seamless collaboration between the land and air components of military operations. Trust between different branches of the armed forces is crucial to operational success.
3. Community Involvement: Every household must take part in protecting their communities and lands, similar to what happened in Maiduguri. The people must be willing to stand up and declare that they have had enough.
4. Restoring Trust: Trust between the populace and the military must be restored. If the military fails to act on intelligence from the community, trust erodes. Building and maintaining this trust is essential.
5. Improving Welfare: The Federal Government must address the welfare of servicemen and women. The current conditions, including the challenges faced by families of fallen heroes, deter commitment and sacrifice. Proper compensation and support for soldiers and their families are imperative.
6. Mining industry: Needs a serious review.
7. Prayers and Faith: Finally, Alan ngoro ba, monjimba. Continuous prayers and faith are needed, as these have been a source of strength and resilience for many communities.
May Allah guide and protect our leaders, and may peace and prosperity reign in our beloved country, Nigeria. Ameen!
Boko Haram claims to be fighting for a religious cause and aims to establish an Islamic state, although this claim is false. However, when it comes to bandits, what are their objectives? I leave you with that question.
